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Abstract: 
As the new government incorporating the populist EKRE party took office in Estonia in spring 2019, 
concerns emerged about Estonia’s long-standing policy outlook of strong Euro-Atlantic integration. Other 
coalition members had to balance EKRE’s policy positions, which manifested in contradictory statements 
and vague decisions. Analysing the Estonian government’s rhetoric about the EU, this paper reveals how 
the government in its first year in office framed the European Union (EU). The Green Deal, or the EU’s 
target of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, emerged as one of the cross-cutting topics in the discourse, 
but the pragmatic rhetoric employed by ministers and the conflict between values and actions raises 
questions about the motivations of the government, and therefore results in what is termed as ‘reluctant’ 
Europeanisation. 
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Introduction 
An unexpected government took office in Estonia in the spring of 2019, after the winner 
of the election – the liberal Reform Party – was unable to find allies to form a government 
and was cast aside in favour of a coalition comprised of the left-leaning Centre Party 
(Keskerakond, KE), the populist radical right Conservative People’s Party (Eesti 
Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE), and the right-wing Christian democratic Pro 
Patria (Isamaa, PP). This move brought Estonia to the centre of international attention 
as yet another European country to have joined the “far-right club” (Gershkovich, 2019). 
The government’s first year in office was characterised by controversies in which 
statements made by members of EKRE were mitigated and even overruled by other 
coalition partners. This led to misunderstandings about the government’s positions both 
in Estonia and abroad (e.g. Vahtla, 2019a, 2019b). This article will focus on one aspect of 
this phenomenon – the policy towards the European Union (EU). 
The coalition’s EU policy started poorly. KE, the party of Prime Minister Jüri Ratas, had 
been grappling with accusations of being pro-Russian owing to its previous leadership’s 
political stance and a strong supporter base among the Russian-speaking Estonians, 
which raised concerns about the continuity of Estonia’s Euro-Atlantic course. The populist 
EKRE established itself as an anti-Russian, Eurosceptic and anti-immigration force 
promoting traditional family values (Kasekamp, Madisson & Wierenga, 2019). PP, the 
minor partner in the coalition, perceived close integration with the West as a security 
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guarantee for Estonia, but held conservative views, overlapping partly with those of EKRE. 
Therefore, immediately after assuming office, the new government had to provide public 
reassurances about Estonia’s Euro-Atlantic outlook (Ots, 2019a) which had always been 
perceived as a given in Estonia’s foreign policy. 
Moreover, the government’s public reiteration was crucial not only for foreign partners 
but also for the pro-EU domestic audience. The support for EU membership has been 
rather high in Estonia – between 65% and 83% from 2004 to 2017 (Austers, 2017) – and 
consistent across party lines. In 2019, 74% of the population supported Estonia’s EU 
membership, including 87% of PP supporters, 74% of KE and 54% of EKRE voters (Ots, 
2019b). EKRE, who employed anti-EU slogans in their rhetoric and belonged to the far-
right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament, had to ensure their 
message was acceptable to the non-Eurosceptic majority of the Estonian public. 
In light of the above, this paper will add to the EU studies literature by providing a case 
study of the Estonian elites’ narrative perceptions of the EU. It asks how did the 
government, in which remarkably different parties held diverse (if not incommensurable) 
views about the EU, frame its discourse? The paper proceeds in three parts. First, it will 
offer a brief overview of Estonia’s Europeanisation to contextualise the positions of the 
government. This is followed by a methodological discussion on using framing and 
content analysis to study perceptions. Third, the paper presents findings from EU-related 
frames which emerged during the government’s first year in office, and discusses the 
narrative of the Green Deal in particular. In doing so, the analysis shows both a continuity 
as well as a break from past governments in terms of discourse on the EU. While this can 
be associated with EKRE in particular, the findings are nuanced and suggest that a more 
reluctant and pragmatic (instrumental) EU policy is emerging in Estonia. The findings 
relate back to the argument about the functions of narratives (see Introduction to the 
Special Issue), as the Estonian case demonstrates the presence and negotiation of 
narrative on all three (system, identity and issue) levels (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin & 
Roselle, 2013; Roselle, Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2014). 
Estonia in the EU: from an eager student to a pragmatic 
Europeanist? 
Membership in the EU and NATO is the cornerstone of Estonia’s foreign policy. 
Integration into the Western political and security structures is perceived as a security 
guarantee against Russia but also represents a more general cultural and political ‘return 
to Europe’ after the Soviet experiment (Kuus, 2007; Mälksoo, 2006). Estonia has been 
described as a poster child for successful post-communist transition (Kasemets, 2013; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010), a ‘top student’ among the 2004 EU accession countries and a 
strong supporter of deeper integration and further enlargement after becoming a full 
member (Ehin, 2013). The country supported fiscal austerity measures after the 2011 
financial crisis. It endorsed various European joint initiatives, such as the Eastern 
Partnership, where it consistently promoted its political preferences in an effort to shape 




European both before and after accession, the degree of Europeanisation has varied, 
depending on the specific policy domain.1 
There is limited previous research on Estonia’s preferences regarding EU climate policy. 
The national position can be characterised as constructive, yet ambiguous. For example, 
it has been shown that Estonia’s compliance with EU policies has been driven by a sense 
of obligation and solidarity rather than the cause of environmentalism (Ehnert, 2019; 
Streimikiene, Ciegis & Pusinaite, 2006). This is supported by the argument that principles 
such as being a constructive member and claiming solidarity with others are central to 
Estonia’s EU policy planning (Raik, 2015, p. 449). The pragmatic stance to climate issues 
has been explained by Estonia’s dependency on oil shale (Roos, Soosaar, Volkova & 
Streimikene, 2012), which has not only economic, but also security, political and social 
implications (Maigre, 2010; Raudsepp, Heidmets & Kruusvall, 2009). While the country 
has financially benefited from selling excess greenhouse gas emission credits under the 
EU Emissions Trading System, Estonia’s political elite has not taken a clear stance on 
climate change, which can primarily be attributed to the lack of domestic political 
demand. As will be shown in the frame analysis below, climate issues merited only a 
passing mention in domestic debates before the European Commission’s respective 
proposal. The sudden adoption of an Estonian climate neutrality target can be considered 
a pragmatic policy approach, rather than driven by shared norms and values. 
Framing the EU through government briefings 
Perceptions can be studied through a variety of approaches, but this paper considers those 
particularly useful, which consider the wider context of what is being communicated. 
Through the process of framing, actors “attribute meaning to the reality and interpret 
relevant information in specific ways” (Voltolini, 2016, p. 1504). Framing therefore points 
to an interaction between events or objects on the one hand, and our interpretation of 
them on the other, resulting in contestable meanings (Snow, Vliegenthart & Corrigall-
Brown, 2007, p. 387). More than that, framing emphasises a distinct aspect of a perceived 
reality that “promote[s] a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Through frames, 
actors can shape an understanding of social processes, and this in turn can influence 
behaviour. Therefore, how a government frames an issue may influence audiences’ 
perception of both the issue itself as well as the government’s policies. 
This paper studies the government’s discourse via core framing tasks (Snow & Benford, 
1988) which distinguish between three elements: diagnostic (how is the problem defined); 
evaluative (what are the potential solutions to the problem); and prescriptive (how is the 
problem treatment understood) (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohring, 2008). The paper 
gives an overview of the Estonian government’s EU frames first, and then focuses on the 
emergence of the Green Deal in particular. 
The body of data for this research consists of transcripts of press briefings of the Estonian 
government’s sessions during their first year in office (29 April 2019 to 30 April 2020). 
The government holds regular meetings on Thursdays and deliberates on various items 
such as draft legislation and EU matters within the purview of the government (including 
 
1 Following Radaelli (2002, p. 108), I define Europeanisation as “[p]rocesses of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and 
then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. 
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the adoption of legal acts). All sessions are followed by a press briefing, and both the 
transcripts as well as video recordings of the briefings are published online in Estonian 
(Vabariigi Valitsus, n.d.). At the briefing, three to four ministers (as a rule, at least one 
from each coalition party) present the items on the agenda. This is followed by a Q&A with 
the press, during which the questions posed may or may not concern the agenda 
(journalists often inquire about other issues of interest). 
Briefings are a valuable source for examining framing processes because they provide a 
regular snapshot of contemporary affairs and are particularly useful for following the 
evolution of policy positions. Full transcripts enable tracing of the exact words used yet 
provide the necessary context in which something is said. Although the immediate 
audience consists of a limited number of journalists, the accessibility of the briefings 
implies that the target audience is wider, including all citizens and foreign partners. 
In using briefings as a data source, certain caveats apply, especially when compared to 
(news) media analysis. For example, the range of topics discussed at briefings is limited: 
the journalists may choose not to raise an issue at a briefing and may approach the 
ministers elsewhere and receive information that is not recorded. In some instances, 
media content analysis may be more appropriate for research than general briefings. In 
the news media, journalists can also provide fact-checking or context to claims made by 
speakers which may be lacking in the ‘unedited’ briefings. 
Data was analysed through a combination of qualitative content and frame analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2019; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Snow, Vliegenthart & Corrigall-Brown, 
2007), which allows for the identification and organisation of broader themes in a text 
corpus by content analysis and helps to dissect particular topics according to framing tasks 
outlined above. The process of data collection and analysis was completed as follows: all 
transcripts were downloaded from the government’s website and saved as plain text. 
Using AntConc software (v 3.5.8), general quantitative characteristics of the text corpus 
were obtained (see overview in Table 1). In the course of one year, 52 press briefings took 
place, including extraordinary sessions. 













Name Number of 
briefings attended 
Party affiliation, position 
held in government 
52 284,883 5478.5 Jüri Ratas 40 KE; Prime Minister 
Urmas 
Reinsalu 








16 EKRE; Minister of 
Finance 
Tanel Kiik 15 KE; Minister of Social 
Affairs 




Next, all transcripts were analysed qualitatively to identify speakers and topics to establish 
a thematic overview. In the same reading, the transcripts were marked for all mentions of 
Europe (Euroopa in Estonian) which included but were not limited to the EU (Euroopa 
Liit in Estonian).2 In the second reading, the Europe-related codes were analysed and 
organised under several labels which emerged from the texts, of which two pertained to 
the EU: ‘EU Politics’ (76 instances) and ‘EU Regulatory’ (28 instances). The label ‘EU 
Politics’ grouped all mentions of EU institutions and everyday decision-making, 
generating a rich pool of data for analysing the government’s discourse. The statements in 
this sample were the most informative and illustrative of Estonia’s positions on the EU 
decision-making and actorness. The label ‘EU Regulatory’ included references to EU 
legislation or national positions on the adoption of EU legal acts. The speakers usually 
presented these items in a matter-of-fact style without much discussion, which gave few 
additional thematic insights but contributed to the descriptive framing of the EU. Taken 
together, the labels helped to formulate a more precise EU frame, consisting of two 
elements – everyday politics of the EU and the EU as a regulator. 
The final step of the analysis focused on the Green Deal in connection with national 
policies, a theme which emerged from the initial coding and intensified through time. The 
initiative was referred to in various formulations (such as ‘climate’, ‘climate neutrality’, 
‘environment’, ‘nature’, ‘Green Deal’) and recurring contexts (e.g. (renewable) energy, 
transport, oil shale, North-East Estonia, greenhouse gas emission quota). Due to the 
widespread use of linguistic variations, no meaningful frequency analysis of the text 
corpus could be conducted, and the topic was explored through frame element analysis by 
identifying the diagnostic, evaluative and prescriptive dimensions. 
Estonian government’s framing of the EU 
Overall, the EU is well represented in the governmental discourse (see Table 2): the 
keyword ‘Europe’ is present in all but one transcript, i.e. in 51 transcripts, and is most 
frequently associated with some variation of ‘European Union’ (349 instances, 55% of all 
references to ‘Europe’). 
Table 2. Frequency of ‘Europe’ in the text corpus 
‘Europe’ 
(number of briefings) 
‘Europe’ 
(number of instances) 
‘European Union’ 
(number of instances) 
51 628 349 
Source: Compiled by author 
Findings indicate that the EU is a normal part of the everyday discourse of the 
government: it is mentioned in various contexts both directly and indirectly and there are 
no significant differences according to party affiliation or domains of responsibility. EU 
membership is presented as of key importance for Estonia, and the era of being an EU 
member as the most prosperous in its history. The discourse of the Eurosceptic EKRE is 
distinct and touches upon the core of Estonia’s identity: EKRE emphasised on several 
occasions that the EU should be a union of sovereign countries and that no further 
federalisation should occur. The same was articulated in the coalition agreement and it is 
significant for two reasons: first, other coalition partners never refer to this in their 
 
2 The text corpus is in Estonian, but the article uses English translations for the sake of clarity. All translations by the 
author unless otherwise noted. 
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statements, and second, the anti-federalist stance is more pronounced compared to 
previous governments who tended to offer at least rhetorical support for further 
integration. EKRE also criticised the EU for being too bureaucratic and centralised but did 
not contest either the EU itself or Estonia’s membership. Kasekamp, Madisson & 
Wierenga (2019, p. 52) have thus suggested that EKRE can be considered as a conditional 
Eurosceptic party who supports cooperating within the EU framework for as long as it 
does not threaten state sovereignty. 
At the briefings, ministers also present national positions prior to the EU Council 
meetings and report on the results afterwards, sometimes highlighting the 
intergovernmental debates. This is a well-established routine and particularly observable 
in cases where the government has a vested interest in showcasing their viewpoint or 
gathering public support. For example, in the case of the discussion on the migration 
agreement in autumn 2019, Minister of the Interior Mart Helme laid out different views 
among EU member states, in order to demonstrate that Estonia was not alone in its (anti-
immigration) position and to underline the conflicting opinions that gave Estonia room to 
manoeuvre (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019e). Notwithstanding the precise motivation of 
ministers for reporting about EU meetings at the briefings, this does show the prominence 
of the EU in the discourse.3 
The most frequent topics in the EU dataset included the Green Deal, Brexit, Cohesion 
Fund allocations, the Multiannual Financial Framework and, more recently, Covid-19-
related financial initiatives. In sum, finances appeared as a central theme throughout the 
discourse: EU initiatives were accompanied by a cost-benefit calculation and budget 
negotiations always addressed the fairness of structural funds distribution. Some 
government members expressed frustration over the fact that EU funds were designated 
for a particular purpose, which, in the words of Minister of the Interior Mart Helme, could 
result in “pan-European scheming” for money (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2020a). Overall, this 
highlights two interconnected points: first, Estonia’s overreliance on EU funds in the state 
budget, and, second, the perception of the EU as a source of money. In this context, the 
EU funds can be perceived as instrumental in helping the Estonian elites to maintain 
power, but they may also promote the idea of Europe and increase the EU’s presence in a 
member state. This will be explored further in the case of the Green Deal which quite 
abruptly emerged in the Estonian government’s discourse. 
Estonia’s turn towards the Green Deal  
The European Green Deal (EGD) is the EU’s initiative for tackling climate change by 
becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, proposed by the European 
Commission in July 2019. Shortly before, in June 2019, the EU failed to commit to climate 
neutrality because four member states, including Estonia, opposed setting net-zero by 
2050 as an EU-wide legally binding target. The Estonian government justified its position 
by arguing that it did not want to commit to unrealistic goals. However, following negative 
international and domestic media coverage (e.g. Tamma & Barigazzi, 2019; Teffer, 2019), 
the Estonian government completely changed its position in July 2019. The shift in 
rhetoric was unexpected because there was neither a clear position on climate policies by 
the coalition parties, nor any significant popular demand for it. Kleinberga (2020) 
observes a similar trend in Latvia in this Special Issue. Only the populist EKRE had 
 
3 Various strands of literature offer explanations as to why the politicians would seek to display their activities on the 
EU level back home, be it gaining electoral support, socialization (Europeanisation), etc. These cannot be explored 




previously argued that the reasons for global warming were unclear and that they would 
consider leaving the Paris Agreement (Krjukov, 2019).  
The coverage of climate issues during the Estonian government’s first year in office can be 
divided into two phases: the pre-EGD period (from May 2019 to mid-July 2019), when 
climate neutrality was barely addressed; and the EGD-period (from mid-July 2019 
onwards), when it was elevated to the centre of government’s discourse. 
During the first phase, the government’s climate policy was close to non-existent, which 
was manifested by a discussion at one of the first government briefings. Prime Minister 
Ratas (KE) commented on the issue of climate change by saying that “[it] needs to be 
addressed…We can all do it by reducing our carbon footprint” (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019a). 
Reacting to this, Minister of Finance Martin Helme (EKRE) appeared to deny 
anthropogenic global warming by stating that “[the fact] that we have ice ages and warmer 
ages has not been proven to be connected to human activity, despite great efforts.” 
(Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019a) Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu (PP) responded to these 
statements by remarking on the importance of pure nature as a national treasure 
(Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019a). In sum, there were only few mentions of climate issues and no 
government positions on the topic during the pre-EGD period, which significantly limits 
the data for frame element analysis. As shown above, of the three coalition partners, EKRE 
dismissed climate change as a problem, while KE and PP diagnosed climate change as a 
problem in general terms but offered little substance regarding evaluation (what can be 
done to solve the problem) or prescriptions (how should these measures be weighed). It 
can be concluded that neither the Estonian government as a whole nor individual coalition 
partners had a clear stance on climate neutrality when it emerged on the EU agenda in 
June 2019. 
The situation changed less than a month after the failure to agree on the climate neutrality 
target by 2050 in the European Council when Prime Minister Ratas announced the 
establishment of a new governmental commission for climate and energy and declared 
climate change a political priority (Estonian Government, 2019). It was framed as a 
national initiative without any reference to the EU or the EGD. From here onwards, the 
question of climate neutrality by 2050 and the implications for achieving it in Estonia 
became a regular theme in the government’s rhetoric. This will be addressed in the 
following frame element analysis of the EGD-period (see Table 3 for summary). 
In terms of the first frame element – diagnosis of the problem – no clear view about the 
roots of climate change could be detected, which can be explained by the diverging 
opinions outlined above. Speakers referred to the “changing paradigm in the world [about 
climate change]” (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019b) and to an agreement by the coalition that the 
issue needed to be addressed (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019c). The second frame element, 
focusing on the evaluation of policy responses, was mostly presented through achieving 
two main targets: decreasing greenhouse gas emissions by 7% by 2030 and achieving 
climate neutrality by 2050 in line with the EGD. Ministers juxtaposed measures from the 
electrification of public transport to increasing various alternative energy sources with 
incurring high costs (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2019d). As regards the third element – 
presentation/rejection of the proposed solution(s) – the government explained their 
reluctant stance by emphasising the specific conditions of Estonia which were in 
contradiction to the goals of the EGD. Estonia’s main source of greenhouse gas emission 
is oil shale (OECD, 2017), yet multiple sectors rely on its supply: it guarantees energy 
security, contributes to the economy, sustains the mining industry, and thereby provides 
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social stability. Proposing changes that could interrupt the (socio)economic system would 
be a highly unpopular move for any government. 
Table 3. Frame element analysis of the government’s discourse on the European Green Deal 
Diagnosis 
What caused the problem of 
climate change? 
Evaluation 
What are the solutions/ 
responses to the problem? 
Prescription 
How to evaluate the 
solutions/ responses? 
Climate change is real/ The 
changing paradigm forces 
Estonia to respond 
No clear views on whether 
climate change is human-
induced 
Meeting greenhouse gas 
emission target for 2030, 
achieving climate neutrality 
by 2050 
Comprehensive EGD package 
with adequate compensation 
High economic and social 
transaction costs 
Not enough funds to 
compensate for the socio-
economic implications of the 
transformation; 
Mixed messages of values and 
actions, instrumentalisation 
of EGD 
Source: Compiled by author 
Therefore, while EU policymakers presented the EGD as a solution, the Estonian 
government perceived it as an obligation, above all, owing to the need to address sensitive 
and long-term structural problems. The government’s key message was to insist on 
adequate compensation from the proposed Just Transition Fund to guarantee a fair socio-
economic transformation to a low-carbon economy. Yet, while the government 
acknowledged the importance of shared values and commitment to climate neutrality in 
rhetoric, its actions such as the establishment of a shale oil plant and pre-refinery or 
lowering the excise duty on diesel (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2020b) conflicted with these goals, 
thereby raising questions about the underlying motivations. The climate-sceptic EKRE 
spoke directly to the reasons behind the government’s approach. During a weekly media 
appearance to their audience, EKRE ministers declared climate change an imported 
problem and, although EGD measures were regarded as drastic, argued that it was 
reasonable not to block the EGD but seek to benefit from it (Uued Uudised, 2019). To sum 
up, despite the prominence of climate issues during the EGD period, the government’s 
rhetoric about EGD was vague and reluctant at best. 
Conclusion 
This article has presented the study of elite perceptions of the EU in the case of Estonia’s 
first government to include a populist right-wing party EKRE. On the one hand, findings 
show that the EU was normalised in the government’s rhetoric. The Eurosceptic EKRE 
seized the opportunity to communicate its views to the public, and while it may have 
disturbed what appeared a common-sense and generally supported approach to the EU, 
this did not result in major changes to Estonia’s EU policies or contestation of EU 
membership. 
On the other hand, the level of commitment to the goals of the EU on the part of the 
Estonian elites has to be questioned as the government’s approach indicated ‘reluctant’ 
Europeanisation. The European Green Deal was not a priority for the Estonian 




socioeconomic reasons for the lack of enthusiasm on climate neutrality, and net-zero 
initiatives were perceived by the government as obligations or as a means to more 
pragmatic politics, without indicating a broader sense of alignment with the EU’s norms 
and values. The findings from the Estonian case add to the existing literature on the 
process of Europeanisation in the current European political context. The paper shows 
that the existing pro-European narrative can be renegotiated into a more reluctant one. 
However, more research is needed to disentangle the complex relationship between 
European integration, the rise of populism in the EU and the political and economic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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